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THE TWO FACES OF EMERGENCE
IN ECONOMICS

Mark Kuperberg

^s this anthology makes clear, there is not one defin

emergence that is universally agreed upon, nor for prog
be made in the field does there need to be one. For the p
of this essay, however, I will use a stripped down definitio
if not common to all emergent processes, does at least su
rize what is at the core of most examples. These core char

tics include:

1) At least two levels of organization,
2) A multitude of individual agents at the lower level of organization who operate by following simple rules, and
3) An aggregate outcome at the higher level that results from the
interaction of these individual agents, but which is not easily derivable from the rules that the individual agents follow. Many times,
therefore, this aggregate outcome comes as a surprise to the observer because nothing in the rules at the lower level seem to predetermine the aggregate outcome.

If we take these three characteristics to be a canonical representation of emergence, then economics was the first discipline

to have emergent processes at its core. In 1776, Adam Smith
wrote in The Wealth of Nations:
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the

baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their
own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to

their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of

their advantages. (14)
every individual . . . neither intends to promote the public interest,
nor knows how much he is promoting it. ... he intends only his
own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its

produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own

Mark Kuperberg is Professor of Economics at Swarthmore College.
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gain, and he is in this, as in many other case
hand to promote an end which was no part of

it always the worse for the society that it was n

ing his own interest he frequently promote
more effectually than when he really intend

The above quotations are certainly the mo
economics, and they remain the central do
to this day. What distinguishes an economi
scientists (and other people in general) is a f
at the lower level, when channeled through
will result in a beneficial outcome at the ag
economics has discovered many exceptions

remain the exception and Adam Smith's
rule. With the exception of evolutionary
modern academic discipline that so thoro
concept of emergence at its core.

In this essay, I begin by providing the read

knowledge of economics that is necessary
ments, and I then introduce two explicit e
reach conclusions which are at variance with
Adam Smith. Finally, I discuss Macroeconom
modeling has not proceeded very far but w

needed.

Economic Theory and Practice

The Gold Standard in economics is economic efficienc

Pareto efficiency) .* An allocation of resources is efficient
impossible to make any one person better off without ma

someone else worse off. At an efficient allocation, all waste has

been squeezed out of the system in the sense that the only way to
improve the well being of one person is by taking resources away
from and thereby harming someone else. At an efficient allocation, all possibilities for mutually improving the well being of individuals have been exhausted. Economics is, in essence, the

study of how to know when these conditions are met, when they
are violated, and what to do when they are violated.

Adam Smith never used the phrase "economic efficiency" and

did not know the formal conditions under which it could be

achieved. However, when economics was formalized in the nine-

teenth century, it became clear that under suitable assumptions,
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competitive markets of the kind that Adam Smith championed
would achieve economic efficiency. This insight is so central to
modern economics that it is known as the First Fundamental

Theorem of Welfare Economics. It also became clear, alth

not formalized until the twentieth century, that many of the in

tutions that Adam Smith condemned, such as monopolies
sulted in economic inefficiency. The corpus of knowled

developed after Adam Smith, which in so many ways confir
his intuitions, is called Neoclassical or Walrasian economics.3

A curious thing about Neoclassical economics is that the ec
omy is not modeled as an emergent process; in fact, quit

opposite. The Neoclassical tradition is so far removed from em
gence that many of its central propositions can be derived fr
and illustrated by, an economy with just one individual. That

individual is called "the representative agent" or with a

more literary flair, "Robinson Crusoe." Economists use a Ro
son Crusoe economy as a pedagogic tool to derive the condit
for economic efficiency. If you only have one person, econo
efficiency is synonymous with Robinson behaving sensibly
not wasting any of his resources. The Robinson Crusoe econ
enables economists to turn what is a hard problem of ma
analysis into what is, in essence, an engineering problem:
Robinson might best maximize his lifetime utility.

Modern economists have become so accustomed to using

Robinson Crusoe as an explanatory tool, that they may not
ize how much of Adam Smith's original insight is lost. For Sm

what was surprising was that individuals motivated by self- inte

could nevertheless promote the interest of society. In a Robi
Crusoe economy, there is no society, and it is completely un

prising that Robinson Crusoe promotes his own self-inte
While not all propositions in Neoclassical economics can b
derstood by studying an economy with one individual, it is

prising how many can. Still, this surprise is diametrically opp
to Adam Smith's surprise. What made Smith's insight so rem

able was his awareness that there was a disconnect between the

two levels of analysis: The rule at the level of the individual was
self-interest, but what emerged at the societal level was what we
now call economic efficiency. In the Robinson Crusoe correspondence, the rule at the level of the individual is optimization and

the outcome at the societal level is what we now call a Pareto
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efficient/ optimal allocation. There is not

optimality flowing from the behavior of an i

economy when the economy contains only
It should be emphasized that the First Fu
of Welfare Economics is not a form of m
phism. The Welfare Theorem is a rigorous
that does not conceive of the economy as
The problem comes when economists sta
about the real economy on the basis of a r
The conditions under which the behavior
can be predicted from the behavior of on
severe. They basically amount to assuming

economy is identical in terms of tastes
course, is never true. Take the simplest

sume that it is the case that when the fish
spends more time fishing because the pric
foregone leisure has declined. Even if this
ual, we cannot conclude that for an entire

for fish will go up as the price falls. What is
may not be true for the society as a whole.

Theorem of Welfare Economics does not
spondence. What the Theorem guarantees
is competitive and certain other assumpt
the price offish falls, whatever outcome em
The Dark Side of Emergence

So, the first face of emergence in economics which co

down to us from Adam Smith is a very positive one: The roa
heaven may be paved with bad intentions. Agents acting self
can, nevertheless, create an aggregate outcome such that it i
possible to make someone better off without making someo

else worse off. This is an amazingly strong statement. A

Nobel Laureate Kenneth Arrow wrote in General Competitive
ysis, a textbook that codified Neoclassical economics for a ge

ation of economists:

the notion that a social system moved by independent actions in
pursuit of different values is consistent with a final coherent state
of balance, and one in which the outcomes may be quite different
from those intended by the agents, is surely the most important
intellectual contribution that economic thought has made to the
general understanding of social processes.4 (1)
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The Schelling Segregation Model

The first economist, to my knowledge, to create an emergent
model whose outcomes were not socially desirable was Thomas
Schelling in Micromotives and Macrobehavior (1978). Schelling ana-

lyzed how neighborhoods would emerge given that people had
some preference to live near people like themselves.
Figure 1 below illustrates a "society" where people (the grey
and black dots) are distributed randomly throughout the space.5

Figure 1

Each individual has 8 neighbors, and we assume that they w
move unless 3/8th (37.5%) of their neighbors are of the sa
color as themselves. This is not a strong preference for segre
tion, and as a result, in Figure 1, 72.1% of the people are hap
- meaning that they have at least three neighbors of their sa
color. Nevertheless, when you move people around until no o
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is unhappy, Figure 2 emerges which has a s
segregation.

Figure 2

In Figure 1, approximately 50% of one's neighbors shared the
same color, but in Figure 2 the number is over 80%. The surprise
is that a relatively mild preference for living with people of the
same color results in a substantial degree of segregation. So the
rule at the lower level, "move if less than 3/8ths of your neigh-

bors are of the same color," results in an aggregate outcome

where more than 80% are of the same color.
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The Schelling Model does not relate directly to economics.
While the outcome is bad given a social preference for integration, one cannot say that the outcome is inefficient. In fact, since
in the final equilibrium everyone is satisfied with their neighborhood, one could say the outcome is efficient. Of more relevance
to economics is the model in Figure 36 which is derived from a
paper by Kirman.7 Ostensibly, it is a model of ants who have a
nest in the middle of the graph and forage for food from two

equidistant food sources (red and blue) at the edges of the
graph.
There are three kinds of ants: ants that have no source affilia-

tion, blue ants who forage at the blue source, and red ants who
forage at the red source. Initially all ants have no affiliation, but
when they discover one of the sources, they become that kind of
ant and bring food back to the nest and then go out again to that
source. If a blue ant encounters an unaffiliated ant (one that has
not yet discovered a source), then that ant is recruited to become a
blue ant (similarly for red ants). The final effect that makes the
model interesting is that an affiliated ant that is not carrying food
can be converted to the other color with some probability if it encounters an ant of the other color.

This model can be applied to a range of economic situations
such as those in which people are choosing to adopt one of two
alternative technologies, choosing to do business with one of two
alternative firms, and so forth. The model then neatly illustrates
two opposing views of how competition in such situations will
evolve:

1) Since the food sources are equidistant from the nest, equally
plentiful, and the ants initially move randomly, one might think

that 50% of the ants will be red and 50% will be blue. In the con-

text of this model, this would be the "competitive" outcome, and it
is what would be predicted by what economists call the Hotelling

model.8

2) Since ants can recruit and convert other ants that they meet,
one might think that if one source develops a lead in ant affiliation, it will build on that lead and ultimately all the ants will be of
that color. This is sometimes called the "first stake in the ground"
theory.

Which of these two outcomes emerges is not only of academic
interest. One of the major driving forces behind the stock market
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Figure 3

bubble of the late 1990' s was the belief that if a firm developed a

lead in internet customers, it would lock in that customer base

and have very high profits in the future even if it was currently
suffering severe loses. What the model shows is that, as expected,
if there is no recruitment or conversion of ants, the Hotelling
result emerges: Approximately 50% of the ants are red and 50%
are blue. Surprisingly, this result is essentially unchanged if there

is recruitment but no conversion. With recruitment and no con-

version, the ability of ants affiliated with a given source to recruit

other ants does not tip the scales irreversibly to the first source
found. The fact that ants are randomly searching for a source at

the beginning insures a nearly equal split between sources. In
either case, without the possibility of conversion, the model is in
equilibrium when all ants are affiliated with some source; recruitment simply speeds this process up.
Figure 4 illustrates the case of recruitment and conversion at a
rate of 75% and plots the proportion of red ants. As can be seen,
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even after more than 14,000 periods the model does not settle
into an equilibrium; the percentage of red ants fluctuates widely.
Why is this? The reason is the complex interplay between positive
and negative feedback that is at work in the model. Positive feedback results from the fact that when there are more ants of a

particular color, it is more likely that an unaffiliated ant will meet

an ant of that color and be recruited and from the fact that there

are more "missionary" ants of that color to convert ants of the
opposing color. If these were the only mechanisms in operation,
eventually all ants would be of one color. Negative feedback results from the fact that when there are more ants of a particular
color, there are necessarily more ants who are not carrying food

of that color. For ants of the other color, therefore, there are

many potential converts. For the ants of the minority color, the
graph is a target rich environment. If the conversion rate is set
high enough, these two forces are continually at war with one
another and neither of the two intuitions discussed above is

correct.

Figure 4

Figure 4 illustrates the danger in telling top-level stories o
finding patterns in top-level phenomena when the underlyin
process is emergent. Looking at the time series in Figure 4

This content downloaded from 130.58.65.13 on Wed, 04 Oct 2017 18:47:22 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

58 SOUNDINGS Mark Kuperberg

macroeconomists might analyze the tops and

cent red ants as peaks and troughs of bus
macroeconomic explanations for their oc
stock market analysts might look at the pa
ants and claim to be able to predict future

know from how the model was constructed t
stories about movements during particular
sense because all of the observed phenomen

teractions at the local level.

A New Kind of Economics

Just as there are multiple definitions of emergence, there ar
multiple descriptions of how an economics based on emergen
principles differs from traditional neoclassical/Walrasian eco
nomics. As I did with my definition of canonical emergence, I
will state the minimum set of characteristics that distinguish what

has come to be known as "agent based computational econom

ics" from traditional economics.

A fortiori, agent based computational economics is populated
by heterogeneous agents. I say a fortiori because it is in the very
nature of Emergence that agents interacting at a local level can-

not be identical. So, for example, in the segregation model,
agents differ by their initial position in the grid and therefore by

who their immediate neighbors are. Even if agents were initially
programmed to be identical, their local interaction with one another would be different and they would soon cease to be identical. This necessary lack of a representative agent means that one

cannot in emergence adopt the Robinson Crusoe methodology
where economic efficiency flows to the whole economy from the
maximizing behavior of one individual. Still, heterogeneity in no
way negates the First Theorem of Welfare Economics. A strength

of the First Theorem and of Walrasian economics is that both are

perfectly capable of dealing with any degree of heterogeneity. So,
while some economists see heterogeneity as a hallmark of agent
based computational economics, its real role is to eliminate the
possibility of using the intellectually suspect Robinson Crusoe
methodology.
What fundamentally differentiates agent based computational
economics from traditional Walrasian economics is that eco-

nomic activity occurs outside of equilibrium. Equilibrium is
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state of rest for any system: It is the "state of balance" referred to

in the quotation from Kenneth Arrow. Agent based models can
certainly have an equilibrium. In the segregation model, for example, equilibrium occurs when everyone is content with the

color distribution of their neighbors. This equilibrium is not

unique, however, if by unique we mean that any initial pattern of
dots will produce an identical final pattern of dots; rather, the
outcome depends critically on the initial placement of the dots
and also on the order in which people get to move. It is generally
the case that once out of equilibrium trades or economic activity
are allowed, the ultimate equilibrium, if there is one, will not be

unique.
While the existence of an equilibrium is important for the
analysis in this essay, uniqueness of the equilibrium is not a central concern. The essential question is whether the equilibrium
will be efficient. Under standard assumptions, what assures efficiency in traditional Walrasian economics is a fictitious character

called the Walrasian auctioneer who aggregates all supply and
demand information and allows trading only at market clearing
prices. In other words, equilibrium prices are first established by
the auctioneer and then trading takes place. It is never the case
that someone wants to supply or demand something at current
prices and cannot find a willing buyer or seller. The Walrasian
auctioneer is the economics version of a top-down coordinator,
and it is a hallmark of emergent processes that there is no such
coordinator. Without the auctioneer, one must generate the final
equilibrium from the local interaction of the individual agents.
Under what circumstances such an equilibrium will be efficient is

an open question.
Macroeconomics

Macroeconomics is the study of the economic activity
economy taken as a whole. To carry out this study, m
nomists create economywide aggregates of individual re
variables. Some of these aggregates are sums of individu
ables such as gross domestic product, w7hich is the sum
the economy's production of goods and services for a gi
period; other aggregates are averages of individual varia
as the price level or the inflation rate, which average in
prices and their percentage changes. The goal of macroec
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ics is to understand the movements of and
tween these various aggregates. If we conce
an emergent system, then from this descrip
vious that macroeconomics is inherently the

behavior.

Modern macroeconomics began with the publication in 1936
of The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money by John

Maynard Keynes. Virtually since its inception, there has been a
research agenda to provide microfoundations for the relationships between the macroeconomic aggregates. For the most part,
this research program has used traditional neoclassical/Walra-

sian economics to provide the microfoundations. Such an approach contained within itself an internal contradiction which
only became fully obvious in the 1970's with the advent of what is
known as New Classical Economics. We have seen that traditional

Walrasian economics shares with Adam Smith an optimistic view
of the workings of the economy. The central message of The General Theory, however, was that the performance of the economy
would many times be sub-optimal. Because the central tendencies of Walrasian and Keynesian economics are diametrically opposed, the effort to provide microfoundations for Keynesian
macroeconomics has yet to produce a model that is convincing

to most economists.

What I wish to argue here is that the reason for this failure may

be that we are using the wrong microeconomic paradigm. Instead of using traditional neoclassical/Walrasian analysis, perhaps we should be thinking in terms of emergent processes. This
has implications for both economic efficiency and economic predictions. With respect to predictions, we can see that the ants
model exhibits internally generated behavior that is apparently
cyclical. I say "apparently" because there unquestionably is not a

mechanism generating a fixed periodicity to these cycles. The
cyclical behavior emerges from the local interaction of the ants.
This is in stark contrast with the standard macroeconomic explanation for apparent cyclical behavior that is found in both Keyne-

sian and New Classical macroeconomics. According to the

standard view, apparent cyclical behavior is generated when the
economy is hit by an aggregate exogenous disturbance, a natural
disaster, say, or a political conflict. The internal mechanisms of
the economy then augment and ultimately dampen down this
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disturbance, and the only reason that there appears to be busi-

ness cycles is that the economy is hit later on by another

disturbance.10

A key premise behind the standard view is that macroeconomic events must have macroeconomic causes: Changes in the
macroeconomic aggregates must be the result of macroeconomic
disturbances. This is precisely what an emergent perspective calls
into question. What the standard view calls a macroeconomic disturbance can be, as in the ants model, the bubbling up to the

macroeconomic surface of small events at the local level. Some

events at the local level are nullified at the local level: So, for

example, an ant not carrying food converts to the opposing
color, but then meets an ant of its original color and converts
back. We never see these events at the top-level and are completely unaware of their existence. But sometimes, a local interaction, or the random occurrence of many local interactions of the
same type, is propagated by positive feedback into a bigger and
bigger event until it emerges at the top-level as a macroeconomic
event.

In the give and take between micro and macroeconomis
standard line by microeconomists is, "there is no such thin
macroeconomics," by which they mean that all that really ex
individual behavior and its aggregation into markets. Emer
processes, of course, have precisely this quality. The case ca
made that all of what is observed at the top-level is epiphen
nal and that the only reality is the local interactions. I woul
gue, however, that this does not imply that one has to give
aggregate relationships or on the possibility of finding hig
level laws. The paradigm should be Boyle's Law where an ag
gate equation describes the top-level behavior of a gas wi
reference to the interactions of the individual gas molecules
aggregate relationship must, of course, be consistent with w
happening at the micro level, but in an emergent system th
no presumption that the aggregate outcome will have a s
correspondence to the micro rules.

With respect to economic efficiency, while both Keynesian

New Classical economics share a common view that macroeco-

nomic outcomes have macroeconomic causes, they come to d

metrically opposite efficiency conclusions. New Classical

economics follows the Walrasian tradition and relies very heavily,
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almost exclusively, on representative ag
surprising, therefore, that it comes to
economy is operating efficiently. The ho
out for Keynesian economics is that by
tive agent, it also eliminates the all too
tween optimality at the individual level
level. This opens up the rich possibility
optimally will interact with one anothe
top-level outcome will not be efficient.
approach will bear fruit remains to be s
NOTES

1. Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 1776, New York: Modern Library, 2
As an eighteenth-century man, Adam Smith was referring to Providence,

God, when he used the phrase "invisible hand." So Smith's views canno
considered fully modern because emergence, as now understood, does
consider the phenomena that emerge at the higher level to be designe
anyone. But, when modern economists refer to the "invisible hand," t
mean the impersonal forces of supply and demand which is consistent w
the meaning of emergence.
2. Named after the economist Vilfredo Pareto who first systematized the
ditions that are satisfied by an efficient allocation of resources in Manu
Political Economy, 1906, trans. Ann S. Schwier, New York: A. M. Kelly, 19
3. Named after Leon Walras who first formalized the economy as a gen
equilibrium system in Elements of Pure Economics, Homewood, IL: Ameri
Economic Association, 1874, trans. William Jaffe 1954.
4. Kenneth Arrow, General Competitive Analysis, San Fransisco: Holden1971

5. NetLogo model created by Uri Wilensky 1998.
6. NetLogo model created by author.

7. Alan Kirman, "Ants, Rationality, and Recruitment," Quarterly Journal of

nomics 108.1 (February 1993):137-57.
8. Named after Harold Hotelling, who in "Stability in Competition," Econ
Journal 39.153 (March 1929): 41-7, first developed an equilibrium mode
spacial competition.
9. There is a lot of confusion in the emergence literature as to whether e
gent phenomena are necessarily random and/or unpredictable. The A
model has a random element in the conversion rate, but that is not centra
to the result. Where technical analysts go wrong is in assuming that one

predict the movements in the graph based on past movements in

graph. In order to predict the movements of the percent red ants, o

needs to know where every ant is and how it is interacting with every ot
ant.

10. There is a large literature dealing with endogenous business cycles, but th
is not the majority view among macroeconomists.
11. It is important not to claim too much for emergent modeling and too litt
for the traditional Walrasian approach. Traditional economics has analyzed
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a full set of conditions under which markets do not result in efficiency. The

most empirically important are: 1) externalities which result in excessive
pollution and 2) information asymmetries which result in malfunctions of
insurance and financial markets. Likewise, it is not the case that all emergent models will result in inefficiency, sometimes the emergent outcome
may mirror the Walrasian outcome. The point made in the text is that the
central tendency of these modeling strategies is different.
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